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Abstract. Monitoring programs for finite state properties is challeng-
ing due to high memory and execution time overheads it incurs. Some
events if skipped or lost naturally can reduce both overheads, but lead
to uncertainty about the current monitor state. In this work, we present
a theoretical framework to model these lossy event streams and provide
a construction for a monitor which observes them without producing
false positives. The constructed monitor is optimally sound among all
complete monitors. We model several loss types of practical relevance
using our framework and provide construction of smaller approximate
monitors for properties with a large number of states.
Keywords: Runtime Verification · Finite State Properties · Optimization
1 Introduction
Monitoring the execution behavior of software goes back to the dawn of pro-
gramming and is a standard practice, e.g., through logging, programmer inserted
print statements, and assertions. In the late 1990s, researchers began to explore
the use of formal specifications to define run-time monitors [1] which brought
the expressive power of formal methods to monitoring. Such run-time verifica-
tion techniques rely on a set of defined events which denote the occurrence of
program behavior relevant to a property specification, e.g., the invocation of
a particular method, along with associated data, e.g., method parameters. A
run-time monitor observes an event stream generated by a program execution,
incrementally updates the state of the specified property, and reports a property
violation when a violating state is reached.
Run-time verification is attractive because it complements sound static verifi-
cation approaches that cannot scale to modern software systems. The past two
decades have witnessed work on scaling run-time verification in three dimensions.
The family of specification languages for monitors has been steadily increasing in
number and expressive power, e.g., [2]. The treatment of high-level abstractions
that are present in modern languages, such as, object identifiers for specifying
properties of class instances, has been addressed, e.g., [3]. Finally, a range of tech-
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niques for reducing the run-time overhead, while preserving violation detection,
have been developed, e.g., [4,5,6,7].
In this paper, we consider the additional challenge of lossy event streams that
arises in the deployment of run-time verification in realistic system contexts
such as: networked and distributed systems where message loss or reordering
may be inherent, real-time systems which may shed monitoring workloads to
meet scheduling constraints, or web-based systems with quality-of-service guar-
antees may lead to suppressed monitoring. In such systems, the original event
stream may be perturbed by dropping events, reordering events, or dropping or
corrupting data correlated with events.
Lossy event streams are problematic for existing run-time verification approaches
since treating a lossy stream the same as the original stream may lead to missing
a property violation or falsely declaring a violating execution. Lossy streams
do not, in general, permit the same degree of precision as the original stream.
However, as we demonstrate, run-time verification frameworks can be adapted
to effectively bound the impact of the loss on verification results.
The paper makes foundational contributions to runtime verification by (a) defin-
ing an expressive framework for modeling lossy event streams, (b) developing
techniques for synthesizing provably complete and optimal verification monitors
under those models. Importantly, these results preclude the need for additional
theory development for individual loss types and set the stage for more applied
work and tool development. The applicability and utility of these methods are
demonstrated by (c) formulating a collection of diverse loss models and, (d) eval-
uating the ability of the methods to detect property violations in the the presence
of losses in practice.
Moreover, we discuss how the event losses in current literature are specific in-
stances of our generalized framework in §5 and §8.
In the next section, we provide an overview of our solution. After introducing
notation and basic definitions, in §4 we formalize the loss model and show how
verification monitors can be constructed that are complete and optimal for that
model. §5 presents example instantiations of the framework that highlight its
range. We describe related work in §8.
2 Overview
We illustrate the problem of loss in monitoring stateful properties by way of
example and introduce the key insights behind the techniques we develop to
address the problem.
Safety properties for run-time monitoring can be modelled using determinis-
tic finite-state automata (DFA). An event is represented by a symbol and an
Optimal RV over Lossy Event Streams 3
q0
q1
q2
qerr
c
n
u
u
n
(a) SafeIter Property
q0
q1
c/1, n/1, u/1, c/c, n/n, u/u
c,n,u
c/2, n/2, u/2
(b) Loss Filter
q0
q1
q2
qerr
c,1,2
2
n,1,2
u,1,22
u,1,2
n,1
,2
(c) Alternate Property
Fig. 1: Safe Iterator – after creating (c) an iterator no updates (u) are permitted
so long as next (n) elements remain to be accessed.
event stream by a string of symbols. Fig.1a shows the DFA for the safe iter-
ator property which states that modification of a collection during iteration is
not permitted. The DFA is expressed over the alphabet {c, n, u} denoting cre-
ation of an iterator, accessing the next element in the iterator, and updating the
collection being iterated.
The state qerr is a sink state (self transitions ommitted for brevity) denoting the
violation of the property. All violating strings include a subsequence . . . un . . .
indicating that an update was performed prior to accessing the next element.
Statements that are free of such a subsequence end at one of the three accept
states and are non-violating.
Loss may come in different forms. For example, symbols in a string may be
erased (e.g., c→ ), reordered (e.g., nu→ un), or be modeled with only partial
information (e.g., their count nnn→ 3).
To illustrate, we consider the case where symbols are dropped from the string,
but the number of dropped symbols is recorded. This type of loss could be
introduced intentionally as a means of mitigating excessive runtime overhead in
monitoring, while preserving fault detection capability. Consider a string cnnun
where this loss is applied to the 2nd and 3rd symbols – we model the resulting
string as c2un. This could represent 4 possible strings with a prefix of c, followed
by an element of {u, n}2, and a suffix of un. For longer strings where sequences of
length k are lost, the combinatorics of their possible replacements {u, n}k make
it intractable to consider all of the possibilities. Despite this, the structure of
Fig. 1a dictates that any string of the form ckun violates the property, thereby
illustrating that even with loss it is possible to perform accurate monitoring.
We formalize the intuition above in a loss model that maps symbols from the
property to an alternative symbol set. For example, the loss model described
above is defined by the mapping {u, n}k 7→ k. In §4, we show that all mappings
of interest are a restricted class of relations on strings called rational relations.
Rational relations can be represented by non-deterministic finite-state transduc-
ers (NFTs). An NFT maps an alphabet, Σ, to an alternative alphabet, Σa. Fig.
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1b shows the NFT with the mapping for alternate symbols 1 and 2 that lose the
identify of symbols in a subsequence but retain the length of the subsequence.
Then c2un represents the loss of identity of the 2nd and 3rd symbols of any
string of length 5.
String State(s)
O1 cnnunnun qerr
F1 2nun2n { qerr }
cn1unnun { qerr }
cn2nn2 { q2, qerr }
O2 cnnuu q2
F2 c2uu { q2, qerr }
cnnu1 { q2, qerr }
2n2 { q1, q2, qerr }
Fig. 2: Filtered Strings
Retaining partial information about an event
string might be insufficient to conclude that a vi-
olation occurred (or did not occur). We report a
violation only when the partial information is suf-
ficient to conclude that there must be a violation –
such monitoring is complete since it never reports
a false violation. Consider the original string (O1)
in Fig. 2 and the set of 3 filtered strings (F1) in-
duced by the NFT in Fig. 1b. Tracing through Fig.
1a on the first two filtered strings by interpreting
1 and 2 as any individual or pair of symbols, re-
spectively, leads only to the error state – since
they preserve the fact that an n follows a u. These strings would be reported as
violations. On the other hand, the string cnnuu (O2) is non-violating and of the
set of 3 filtered strings (F2) none reach only the qerr state. Completeness assures
that no filtered string can have u followed by a n and monitor in Fig. 1b won’t
report a false violation.
Assuring completeness in violation reporting means, however, that the reporting
of some violations may be missed. For example, the third filtered string for F1
suppresses all u making it impossible to definitively conclude that the observed
string is a violation. Our goal is to report violations on as many strings of
alternate symbols as possible while maintaining completeness. We refer to this
as optimal lossy monitoring and present its formulation in §4 and evaluate its
tolerance to loss in practice in §6.
As detailed in §4, monitoring under a loss model, expressed as an NFT, is
achieved by transforming the property of interest to an NFA with transitions on
the symbols in the NFT’s output alphabet, Σa. Fig. 1c shows the alternate prop-
erty for the property in Fig. 1a transformed by the NFT in Fig. 1b. Transitions
on the alternative symbols, {1, 2}, give rise to non-determinism. The transition
function for a property DFA, δ : S × Σ → S, or an alternative property NFA,
δa : S × Σa → 2S , naturally lift to strings and sets of strings. The correctness
criterion for alternate properties requires that ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : δ(σ) ⊆ δa(f(σ)), and
completeness demands that errors are reported only when δa(f(σ)) ⊆ qerr.
Our formalization of symbol loss is general. It can be used to addresses the no-
tion of natural loss, e.g., where environmental factors result in a symbol being
dropped from an event stream. Loss can also be induced artificially as a means
of suppressing events or data associated with events to reduce monitoring over-
head, which the framework accommodates naturally. We justify the breadth of
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applicability of our approach by demonstrating that it accommodates existing
loss types in the literature [8,7,9] in §5.
3 Basic Definitions
Notation: x ≺ y means string x is a proper prefix of string y. A function f :
X → Y lifted to sets means that f(S) = { f(x) | x ∈ S } ∀S ⊆ X. Middle dot (·)
denotes string concatenation. It may also be lifted to sets of strings. × denotes
the cartesian product of two sets. For a relation R ⊆ X × Y , R(x) = { y | xRy }
and R−1(y) = {x | xRy }. ⇒⇐ denotes a contradiction. #x(y) denotes number
of characters x in string y. If we write an element x ∈ X where a set S ⊆ X
is expected, it denotes the singleton set {x } ⊆ X. f|X| denotes a restriction of
the function f to a subset X of its domain. A partition P of a set S is a set
{P1, P2, . . . } such that Pi are pairwise disjoint nonempty sets (called equivalence
classes) whose union is A. A class representative of Pi is a distinguished element
in Pi. [s]P and repP(s) denote equivalence class and class representative of an
element s ∈ S in P.  represents a proof that is available in the appendix.
Familiarity with regular languages and their properties is assumed. An obser-
vance of a symbol is called an event. A finite set of symbols is called an alphabet.
REG(Σ) is the set of all regular languages over an alphabet Σ.  is the empty
string, and Σ is the alphabet Σ ∪ {  }. A trace is a (possibly infinite) sequence
of events, and an execution is a finite prefix of a trace. A trace x is a continuation
of an execution x′ if x′ ≺ x.
3.1 Finite-state Machines and Transducers
Definition 1 (Finite Automata). A finite automaton is a 5-tuple (Q,Σ, δ, q0,
F ) where Q is the finite set of states, Σ is the alphabet, q0 ∈ Q is a specified
initial state and F ⊆ Q is the set of final states. A deterministic finite automaton
(DFA) has the transition function δ : Q×Σ → Q and a nondeterministic finite
automaton (NFA) has the transition function δ : Q × Σ → 2Q. The transition
function δ is lifted to strings, sets of strings, and sets of states. We call L(A) =
{x ∈ Σ∗ | δ(q0, x) ∈ F } the language of the finite automaton.
Definition 2 (Nondeterministic Finite-State Transducers (NFTs)). De-
fined as a NFA (Q,Σ, Γ, δ, q0, F ), where δ : Q × Σ → 2Q×Γ . After observing
a symbol σ ∈ Σ, the NFT in state q transitions to a choice of q′ with output
γ ∈ Γ where (q′, γ) is one of the pairs in δ(q, σ).
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3.2 Properties, monitors and related terminology
§2 gave two examples of safetly properties modelled as DFAs. More precisely,
we model properties using a minimum-state DFA with a special specified error
state. We give related definitions here.
Definition 3 (Finite-state property). φ is a finite-state property if it is the
minimum-state DFA φ = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, Q\ qerr) with the specified error state qerr.
The error state qerr must be a trap state, i.e. ∀σ ∈ Σ, δ(qerr, σ) = qerr. The
notation Qφ, Σφ, δφ, qφ0 , q
φ
err is used to refer to Q,Σ, δ, q0, qerr respectively for a
property φ. An execution x ∈ Σ∗ violates the property φ if δ(q0, x) = qerr. An
execution x that does not violate the property is non-violating.
Remark 1. L(φ)C = Σ∗ \ L(φ) are all the strings that violate the property φ. If
an execution violates a property, then so do all its continuations (because qerr
is a trap state).
Definition 4 (NFA property). A NFA ψ = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, Q \ qerr) with the
specified error state qerr is an NFA property. The error state qerr must be a trap
state. If ψ is determinized to a minimum-state DFA φ, then φ is a finite-state
property with the error state { qerr }.
For a given property φ, a monitor Mφ is synthesized to observe the events that
a program generates. The monitor keeps track of the current state qcurr, which
is initialized as qcurr = q0 and is updated as qcurr ← δ(q, σ) when the symbol
σ ∈ Σ is observed. A monitor Mφ produces a true verdict – indicating that the
property φ cannot be violated in any continuation of the observed execution, or a
false verdict – indicating that the property has been violated. Till either the true
or false verdict is reached, the verdict is inconclusive. If there is a continuation
of an execution which leads to the false verdict, then the monitor’s current state
is monitorable. In a finite automaton, monitorability of a state q can be checked
by checking existence of a path from q to the error state. We use the terms
“monitor” and “property” interchangeably (e.g. language of a monitor) when it
is clear from the context.
Remark 2. For the analysis in the following sections, the existence of multiple
monitors does not concern us. Therefore we omit any discussion of it. We discuss
it when discussing a particular loss type in §5.
4 Losses, Alternate Monitors, and Superposed Monitors
We presented two loss models in §2. In this section, we begin with related defini-
tions and describe a class of monitors which can observe lossy streams. We dis-
cuss soundness and completeness of these monitors. We then construct optimal
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Let n ∈ Z+ be a positive finite number.
Let Γ = Σ ∪ { 1, . . . , n }
aRb iff
{
|a| = b if b ∈ { 1, . . . , n }
a = b ∧ a ∈ Σ otherwise
(a) Dropped-count Loss. This is the for-
mal definition of loss type from §2
Let ∆ ⊆ Σ be a set of symbols which may
or may not be skipped.
Let Γ = {x′ | x ∈ Σ }
R = { (a, b′) | a ∈ ∆∗b and b ∈ Σ }
(b) Silent Drop Loss. Whenever a filtered
event b′ is observed, any number of dropped
∆ symbols may have preceded it. For this
loss type, we distinguish between the event
b′ under the loss from the event b.
Fig. 3: Formally specified loss types
monitors to observe lossy streams for a given loss model, and discuss optimality
of our construction.
We introduced loss models as a mapping between event symbols or sequence of
symbols to alternate symbols. We thus represent a loss model as a relation.
Definition 5 (Loss Model). Let Σ and Γ be finite alphabets. A loss model is
defined as a relation R ⊆ Σ∗ × Γ .
A loss model gives the information about how a single alternate symbol may
have been produced. If a symbol γ is observed in the lossy stream, then it was
produced in lieu of one of the sequence of symbols in R−1(γ).
Consider the lossy stream 2n2 from 2 for the corresponding original stream
cnnuu (O2). The program is monitored incrementally, so as it runs, we first
observe 2 in lieu of cn, then n, and then 2 in lieu of uu. For our theoretical
analysis, we wish to address the entire history of how a lossy trace would have
been observed, we do that by defining a partial function f on all executions of
the event stream, such that f evaluates to the corresponding lossy execution.
Definition 6 (Filter and Lossy Streams).
Let Σ and Γ be finite alphabets. Consider a loss model R ⊆ Σ∗ × Γ . Then a
partial function f : Σ∗ → Γ ∗ defined on all the prefixes of a trace is called a
filter under R if it satisfies the monotonicity property, defined below:
if f(x) = y and f(x′) 6= y for all proper prefixes x′ of x, then:
f(x · s) =
{
y · γ if sRγ
y otherwise
In the first case γ is called a replacement for the segment s of the string x · s.
FR is defined as the set of all possible functions which are filters under R. If
∃f ∈ FR such that f(x) = y ∧ @x′ ≺ x, f(x′) = y, then we call x a completion
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for y. x is one of the possible executions which could have produced the lossy
stream y. We define C(y) as the set of all completions of y:
C(y) =def {x ∈ Σ∗ | ∃f ∈ FR such that f(x) = y ∧ @x′ ≺ x ∧ f(x′) = y }
A loss type is a parameterization over a family of related loss models. Loss type
for the loss model from §2 is given in Fig. 3.
In the next theorem, we see how we can determine the set of completions C(y)
using just R−1.
Theorem 1. For a string y ∈ Γ ∗, y = γ1γ2 . . . γk (∀i γi ∈ Γ ):
C(y) = R−1(γ1) . . . R−1(γk)
Proof. (LHS ⊆ RHS) Let x ∈ C(y), then ∃ a partition x = x1 . . . xk such that
γ1, . . . , γk are a replacements for respective xi. Then xi ∈ R−1(γi) and thus
x ∈ R−1(γ1) . . . R−1(γk).
(RHS ⊆ LHS) Let x ∈ R−1(γ1) . . . R−1(γk) =⇒ x = x1 . . . xk =⇒ f(x) =
γ1 . . . γk = y. uunionsq
We now start discussing monitors which observe lossy event streams.
Definition 7 (Alternate monitor). Given a primary monitor Mφ and a loss
model R ⊆ Σ∗ × Γ , an alternate monitor Mψ is any finite state monitor over
the alphabet Γ that observes the lossy execution f(e) for any f ∈ FR when Mφ
observes the execution e. We call (Mφ,Mψ)R a primary-alternate monitor pair
and (φ, ψ)R a primary-alternate property pair.
Definition 8 (Soundness and Completeness for a primary-alternate
property pair). For a primary-alternate pair (φ, ψ)R, with the definition of
C lifted to the set of strings, we define:
Soundness: A non-violating lossy stream must not have any violating comple-
tions, i.e. y ∈ L(ψ) =⇒ C(y) ⊆ L(φ), equivalently C(L(ψ)) ⊆ L(φ)
Completeness: A violating lossy stream must have all violating completions, i.e.
y 6∈ L(ψ) =⇒ C(y) ⊆ L(φ)C , equivalently C(L(φ)C) ⊆ L(φ)C
Definition 9 (Optimality for a primary-alternate property pair). For
a primary-alternate pair (φ, ψ∗)R where ψ∗ is complete, ψ∗ is called optimal
if for any other primary-alternate pair (φ, ψ)R, L(ψ
∗) ⊆ L(ψ), or equivalently
C(L(ψ∗)) ⊆ C(L(ψ))
Remark 3. Our definition of Optimality is a strong definition. An alternate def-
inition for an optimal monitor might be to count the number of strings up to
any given length and define a monitor which reports a violation on maximum
number of strings for every length as the optimal monitor, but optimality by our
definition would imply optimality in this alternate definition.
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It is useful to consider the primary-alternate pair (Mφ,Mψ)R as monitoring
together for the purposes of theoretical analysis and for definitions. In practice,
we want to monitor using just Mψ.
So far we have only defined alternate monitors, but we have not revealed a
strategy to construct them. Our strategy is to keep track of the set of states we
could possibly be in. We will now define a special class of alternate monitors to
do this.
Definition 10 (Superposed alternate monitors). Let (Mφ,Mψ)R be a
primary-alternate pair where φ = (Q,Σ, δφ, q0, F ), F = Q \ qerr. Mψ is called
a superposed alternate monitor if ψ is the unique minimum-state DFA for the
NFA property ψN = (Q,Γ, δ
ψ, q0, F ) where the transition function δ
ψ satisfies
the superposed monitor condition, given as follows:
Let ψ’s states be labelled by the subsets of Q (this labelling is well-defined, see
Lemma 1 and Remark 4 below). When Mψ transitions to a state S ⊆ Q and Mφ
is in state q, then q ∈ S. In other words, if x ∈ Σ∗ ends with a segment then
δφ(q0, x) ∈ δψ(q0, f(x)) for any filter f under R. A superposed monitor is in an
imprecise state if for its state S, |S| ≥ 2.
A NFA A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) is determinized (converted to a DFA) B = (2
Q, Σ, δ,
q0, F
′) where F ′ = {S ⊆ Q | S ∩ F 6= φ } such that L(A) = L(B) [10]. The de-
terminized DFA B’s states are labelled by subsets of Q. This gives us a relation-
ship between the states of the NFA and its corresponding DFA. Now we show
that if we further consider the minimum-state DFA for L(B) (hence L(A)), we
can still label its states by subsets of Q.
Lemma 1. In DFA minimization [10] of a determinized NFA, let P be the par-
itition of 2Q where S ∈ P represents a set of states merged together. If the states
S1 and S2 merge, then the state S1 ∪ S2 merges with them. i.e. ∀ S ∈ P,∀
S1, S2 ∈ S =⇒ S1 ∪ S2 ∈ S. 
Remark 4. Using the previous lemma, for each class [S]P of states, the class
representative repP(S) of S is defined as ∪T∈[S]P T . We label the resultant state
from merged states in [S]P in the minimized DFA by rep
P (S).
The intuition behind the superposed monitor condition is that we are always
over-approximating the state (by a set of states) which we would have been in
when monitoring without losses. Due to this over-approximating nature, super-
posed monitors are always complete, as proved next.
Theorem 2. All superposed monitors are complete.
Proof. We give a direct proof. For a superposed monitor Mψ in state q:
y 6∈ L(Mψ) =⇒ δ′(q0, y) = { qerr } =⇒ q ∈ { qerr } =⇒ q = qerr
=⇒ ∀x ∈ C(y), δ(q, x) = { qerr } =⇒ C(y) ⊆ L(M)C uunionsq
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δψ∗(q, x)
=
{
δ(q,Σx) if x ∈ {1 . . . n}
δ(q, x) otherwise
(a) Disabling monitoring for up
to n events, defined on filter from
Fig. 3a
δψ∗(S, x) = C∆(δ(C∆(S), x))
C∆ is the ∆-closure of the set of states S in M , i.e.
set of all states which can be reached from states in
S by following 0 or more y-transitions, where y ∈ ∆
(b) Silent drop monitor, defined on ∆ and the filter
from Fig. 3b
Fig. 4: Example constructions of δψ
∗
for (φ, ψ∗)R as in Theorem 3
Definition 11 (Lopt(φ,R)). For a property φ and loss model R, Lopt(φ,R) =def
FR(L(φ)), i.e. Lopt is the set of lossy strings in Γ ∗ produced by a non-error execu-
tion in Σ∗. Lopt is the smallest set of strings on which a complete alternate mon-
itor cannot reach a false verdict. i.e. Lopt = FR(L(φ)) = { y | C(y) ∩ L(φ) 6= ∅ }.
Our next theorem gives the construction of an optimal monitor, along with proof
of optimality.
Theorem 3. Given a property φ and a loss model R, we construct the NFA
property ψ∗ as the superposed monitor whose transition function δψ is defined
as ∀q ∈ Q, δψ(q, y) = δ(q,R−1(y)). ψ∗ recognizes Lopt.
Proof. Subproof 1: y 6∈ L(ψ∗) =⇒ y 6∈ Lopt. This is the same as the complete-
ness criterion and is implied by Theorem 2.
Subproof 2: y ∈ L(ψ∗) =⇒ y ∈ Lopt. Consider y ∈ L(ψ∗).
=⇒ δψ({ q0 } , y) 6= { qerr }
=⇒ δψ(. . . δψ(δψ({ q0 } , y1), y2) . . .), yn) 6= { qerr }
=⇒ δφ(. . . δφ(δφ({ q0 } , R−1(y1)), R−1(y2)) . . .), R−1(yn)) 6= { qerr }
=⇒ δφ({ q0 } ,C(y)) 6= { qerr } =⇒ y ∈ Lopt uunionsq
Corollary 1. A property φ is monitorable under loss model R iff state {qerr}
is reachable in ψ∗.
Remark 5. Because R can be arbitrary, this construction is only valid if R−1(y)
and δφ(q,R−1(y)) are computable. If R is representable by a NFT, then both of
these are polynomial time computable. 
Fig. 4 and the next section show example optimal monitor constructions.
We have given a liberal definition for a loss model, it can be an arbitrary re-
lation between Σ∗ and Γ . We now show that all loss models of interest can
actually be represented by a more restricted definition – a relation which must
be representable by a NFT.
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Theorem 4. Let (φ, ψ∗)R be the primary-alternate property pair as constructed
in Theorem 3 where R may not be representable by NFT. Then there exists a loss
model R′ which can be represented as a NFT for which the constructed alternate
property is also ψ∗.
The following definitions are required for the proof of Theorem 4.
Definition 12 (Generalized Nondeterministic Finite Automaton [11]).
A generalized nondeterministic finite automaton (GNFA) is a 5-tuple (Q,Σ, δ, q0, f),
where Q is the finite set of states, Σ is the alphabet, δ ⊆ (Q\f)×(Q\q0)→ REG
is the transition function, and q0, f ∈ Q are the specified initial and final states.
Remark 6. A GNFA can be converted to a NFA [10].
Definition 13 (Generalized Nondeterministic Finite-State Transduc-
ers (GNFTs)). Defined as a GNFA (Q,Σ, Γ, δ, q0, f), where δ : (Q \ f)× (Q \
q0) → 2REG(Σ)×Γ . After observing a string x ∈ Σ∗, the NFT in state q transi-
tions to a choice of q′ with output γ ∈ Γ where (r, γ) s.t. x ∈ L(r) is one of the
pairs in δ(q, q′).
Remark 7. A GNFT can be converted to a NFT. A sketch of this conversion
which works by expanding each transition follows. Take a transition (r, γ) ∈
δ(q1, q2). The regex r can be converted to a NFA A = (Q
′, Σ, δ′, q′0, f
′) with a
single accept state by standard algorithms. Now this NFA can be embedded in
the GNFT in place of the transition (r, γ) ∈ δ(q1, q2) by merging the state q1
with q′0 and adding the output γ to all transitions into f
′ and merging f ′ with
q2. Finally, remove the transition (r, γ) from δ(q1, q2).
Proof (Theorem 4). Let δ be the tranistion function for φ. The construction in
Theorem 3 uses δ(q, R−1(γ)) for defining ψ∗’s transition function. Therefore it
is sufficient to produce an R′ representable by a NFT such that δ(q, R′−1(γ)) =
δ(q, R−1(γ)) ∀γ ∈ Γ .
Consider a symbol γ ∈ Γ .
Case 1: (R−1(γ) is regular) We define xR′γ ∀xRγ. So R′−1(γ) = R−1(γ) and
thus δ(q, R′−1(γ)) = δ(q, R−1(γ))
Case 2: (R−1(γ) is not regular) We’ll use the shorthand f(q) : Q → 2Q for
fy(q) =def δ(q,R
−1(γ)).
Consider l(q) : Q → REG(Σ), the regular language taking us from q to f(q),
i.e. l(q) =def {x | x ∈ Σ∗ ∧ δ(q, x) ∈ f(q) }.
Let Lγ =def ∩q∈Q l(q). It follows that Lγ is regular since regular languages are
closed under intersection.
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We note that R−1(γ) ⊆ l(q) ∀q ∈ Q, and thus R−1γ ⊆ Lγ .
We define xR′γ ∀x ∈ Lγ . It is left to prove that δ(q, Lγ) = f(q) ∀q ∈ Q.
We show δ(q, Ly) ⊆ f(q) ∀q ∵ Ly ⊆ l(q) and δ(q, Ly) ⊇ f(q) ∀q ∈ Q ∵
R−1(y) ⊆ Ly.
We construct a GNFT for R′. Consider a GNFT with states { q0, q, f }, -
transitions from q0 to q and q to f , and self loop edges on q ∀γ ∈ Γ with
input label as the regex of R−1(γ) and output label γ. This completes the con-
struction. uunionsq
Moreover, we have also shown that an even more relaxed definition of loss model
(a relation between Σ∗ and Γ ∗ (instead of Σ∗ and Γ ) will not increase the
number of loss models we can express. The two crucial results below complete
our claim that any loss type (arbitrary relation between original and alternate
symbols) for which the final produced property has to be be finite-state, is rep-
resentable in our framework.
If R is defined over Σ∗×Γ ∗, we can always come up with a R′ ⊆ Σ∗×Γ ′ and alter
the transitions of the alternate automata such that transitions for same input
strings in Σ∗ retain the same semantics for state transitions as the unaltered
automata. We prove this in the next theorem.
Theorem 5. Let N be a finite state monitor over a filter f : Σ∗ → Γ ∗ under
R. Then ∃ R′ with a finite range such that ∃f ′ : Σ∗ → Γ ∗, a filter over R′ such
that ∀q ∈ Q ∀x ∈ Σ∗ δ(q, f(x)) = δ(q, f ′(x)).
Proof. We give a non-constructive proof. Partition all strings in Γ ∗ using the
relation ∼ defined as : x ∼ y ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ Q δ(q, x) = δ(q, y)
It is easy to see that ∼ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
There are only |Q||Q| possibilities for δ(q, x) for a fixed x. Thus, the number of
equivalence classes is upper-bound by |Q||Q| and is finite.
Choose a class representative for each equivalence class arbitrarily (e.g. the lex-
icographically least string in that class). Let [y] denote the equivalence class of
y and [y]r denote the class representative.
Define R′ = { (x, [y]r) | (x, y) ∈ R }
Define f ′(x) = [y1]r · [y2]r · . . . · [yn]r where f(x) has segments x1, . . . xn+1 and
replacements y1, . . . , yn.
We prove by induction on segments that ∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Γ ∗δ(q, f(x)) = δ(q, f ′(x)).
Base Case: 0 segments
f(ε) = ε and f ′(ε) = ε. ∴ ∀qδ(q, f(x)) = δ(q, f ′(x)) = q
Induction Hypothesis: ∀q δ(q, f(x)) = δ(q, f ′(x)) where x has < k segments
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Induction Step: Consider x ∈ Σ∗ with segments x1, . . . , xk.
Let x′ = x1 · . . . · xk−1
Then δ(q, f(x))′ = δ(q, f ′(x′)) by induction hypothesis. Let these both equal q′.
Let f(x) = f(x′)y and f ′(x) = f(x′)y′ = f(x′)[y]r
Since ∀q′ [y]r ∼ y, δ(q′, [y]r) = δ(q′, y)
Thus by induction we have proved that δ(q, f(x)) = δ(q, f ′(x) for all q ∈ Q
where x ∈ Γ ∗ with any number of segments, which is just any x ∈ Γ ∗
Remark 8 (Sound alternate monitors). We can also construct a primary-alternate
pair (φ, ψ)R which is sound and may be incomplete by using a construction sim-
ilar to that in Theorem 3 by determinizing it and updating δψ(S, γ)← {qerr} if
qerr ∈ δ(S, R−1(γ)). It can be argued in a similar fashion that this construction
is optimally complete among all sound lossy monitors. 
5 Framework Instantiations
We have already shown the applicability of our framework to loss types such
as those in Fig. 3. In this section, we describe three more instantiations of the
framework that illustrate the variety of realistic event loss models it can accom-
modate.
Counting frequency of missed symbols up to n missed symbols This
loss model was considered in [8] for lossily compressing event traces over a slow
network. It is a modification of the dropped-count filter in Fig. 3a where addi-
tional information about symbols is kept.
Let n ∈ Z+ and let the symbols in Σ be indexed by I = { 1 . . . |Σ| } and be de-
noted by σi where i ∈ I. Define Γ as { (c1, c2, . . . , c|Σ|) | 0 < c1 + . . .+ c|Σ| ≤ n }.
The loss model is defined as R = { (x, (c1, c2, . . . c|Σ|)) |
∧
i∈I ci = #σi(x) }.
We discuss two key differences between our formalization and that of [8]. First,
the total size of the missed symbols is bounded in our case so that we have a finite
alphabet with each transition taking O(1) time in the determinized alternate
DFA. [8] uses a constraint automata which accepts an infinite alphabet and
each transition takes O(|Q|) time. We note that even if more than n symbols
are missed at a time, then up to mn missed symbols can produced m alternate
symbols to transition to the correct set of states in our framework. The second
difference is in consideration of soundness and completeness. While we construct
a complete optimal monitor (without any false positives), they construct a sound
monitor (without any false negatives). As Remark 8 shows, this is not an issue
since we can easily construct a sound monitor instead.
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while cond do
if x <y then
x.a();
x.b();
x.c();
(a) Loop targeted
for instrumenta-
tion removal.
q0
q1 q2
q3
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c
(b) Program prop-
erty DFA. All miss-
ing edges go to error
state (not shown).
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q1 q2
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(c) Alternate mon-
itor NFA. Error
state not shown.
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bc, c/k
(d) A filter to remove in-
strumentation from loop
and replace it with a sin-
gle symbol “k”.
Fig. 7: Missing Events in Loops to be able to remove instrumentation in them.
(1,1)
(2,1) (2,2)
(3,3)
(3,1) (3,2)
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c 1
n1
c2
n1, n2
u
u
n1
n2u
c2u
n 1
n2
n
1 u
Fig. 5: A composite monitor
for SafeIter on two iterators
[12]. (i, j) represents states
(qi, qj) for two different it-
erators and the subscript 1
on events is assigned to the
monitor created first.
Merged Objects Here we look at a new loss
type which loses information about which ob-
ject an event belongs to in a multi-object mon-
itor. Let O = { o1 . . . om } be a set of objects
with parametric events E = e1 . . . en, i.e. e1(o1)
is a distinct event from e1(o2). This means that
Σ = { e(o) | e ∈ E ∧ o ∈ O }.
For σ ∈ Σ, γ ∈ Γ , let σRγ iff σ = γ(o) ∧
o ∈ O. In the filtered event stream, we lose
information about which object the event be-
longs to within O. For the general case we
can build an optimal monitor using the con-
struction in Theorem 3. We give an example of the multi-object prop-
erty “SafeIter” shown in Fig. 1a which states that a collection object
should not be updated while an iterator object on that collection iterates.
(1,1)
(2,1) (2,2)
(3,3)
(3,1) (3,2)
err
c
n
c
n
u
u
nu
cu
n
n
n
u
Fig. 6: Optimal complete al-
ternate monitor.
A composite monitor for the SafeIter property
from [12] is shown in Fig. 5 for two iterators I1
and I2. The loss model R merges events for I1
and I2, and using Theorem 3 to construct the
optimal alternate monitor, we obtain the moni-
tor in Fig. 6. For example, the obtained monitor
only misses the violation for the event streams like
c1uc2n2*n1, i.e. when we actually need the infor-
mation that event n happened on object 1, but can
still report violations for event streams matching
c1n1c2(n1|n2)uu*(n1|n2) or c1uc2(n2|n1)*uu*(n1|n2).
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Table 1: Error detection for short strings (Length 5 to 10). For strings of
lengths 10 - 20, data is available in the appendix.
Property ρ : 0.1, η : 3 ρ : 0.1, η : 6 ρ : 0.3, η : 3 ρ : 0.3, η : 6
ArrayDeque UnsafeIterator 75% (4598) 71% (4595) 39% (4579) 33% (4606)
Collections SynchronizedCollection 75% (4345) 69% (4296) 37% (4298) 30% (4379)
Collections SynchronizedMap 60% (1824) 56% (1798) 19% (1848) 16% (1814)
Collection UnsynchronizedAddAll 90% (4942) 84% (4935) 65% (4942) 52% (4931)
Console CloseReader 85% (4739) 81% (4761) 58% (4764) 46% (4801)
HttpURLConnection SetBeforeConnect 86% (4758) 81% (4759) 57% (4783) 46% (4759)
InputStream MarkAfterClose 86% (4753) 80% (4741) 58% (4777) 46% (4742)
Iterator RemoveOnce 87% (4310) 83% (4288) 63% (4317) 57% (4335)
ListIterator RemoveOnce 83% (3118) 80% (3139) 57% (3092) 53% (3085)
ListIterator Set 83% (3947) 79% (4005) 50% (3963) 43% (3945)
List UnsynchronizedSubList 74% (4564) 71% (4569) 37% (4548) 31% (4582)
Map UnsafeIterator 60% (1870) 57% (1872) 18% (1803) 15% (1844)
Math ContendedRandom 94% (4961) 91% (4970) 82% (4963) 71% (4967)
NavigableSet Modification 60% (1868) 57% (1876) 19% (1921) 15% (1897)
PushbackInputStream UnreadAheadLimit 86% (4268) 80% (4299) 61% (4299) 48% (4265)
Reader ReadAheadLimit 87% (4150) 80% (4144) 62% (4151) 52% (4121)
Reader UnmarkedReset 89% (2434) 90% (2442) 69% (2466) 71% (2453)
Scanner ManipulateAfterClose 75% (4567) 71% (4600) 38% (4549) 31% (4578)
ServerSocket SetTimeoutBeforeBlocking 90% (4940) 85% (4941) 66% (4944) 55% (4952)
ServiceLoader MultipleConcurrentThreads 85% (4940) 81% (4961) 54% (4937) 50% (4934)
Socket CloseInput 75% (4602) 70% (4568) 38% (4586) 32% (4583)
Socket InputStreamUnavailable 90% (4904) 85% (4912) 68% (4911) 57% (4912)
Socket LargeReceiveBuffer 80% (4754) 76% (4795) 48% (4768) 40% (4757)
Socket ReuseAddress 80% (4732) 76% (4765) 48% (4746) 41% (4730)
Thread SetDaemonBeforeStart 95% (4939) 90% (4939) 78% (4941) 69% (4950)
Throwable InitCauseOnce 78% (3971) 73% (3937) 42% (3925) 34% (3948)
Missing Loop Events Significant number of events can be generated within
loops in a program. [7] addresses this by eliminating instrumentation losslessly
within loops when monitoring the first few iterations is sufficient.
We consider an extension of this idea in Fig. 7 where the program structure is
used to obtain the loss model. Instrumentation from the loop is replaced with a
single symbol “k” at the end of the loop. If instrumentation is disabled for all
iterations of the loop, the monitor is in states { q2, q3 } after the event “k”. If the
first few iterations are monitored and event “a” is generated, the monitor will
be in states { q2 } after the event “k”.
The loss model can be calculated using a method from [6]. It presents a static
analysis which finds the set of states that are possible after a program region,
e.g., a loop body, for any given starting state if monitoring were to be disabled in
that region. We can use this information directly instead of R−1(k) in Theorem
3 for computing δ′(q, k) ∀q. This is equivalent to mapping the set of strings
which go from q to δ′(q, k) to the new symbol for the loss model.
6 Empirical Study
We implemented the optimal monitor construction algorithm and dropped-count
loss type Fig. 3a to qualitatively analyze the behavior of optimal monitors under
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(a) String length vs percentage of strings a
violation was observed on. These 5 properties
show trends which are representative of all
properties.
ρ η %
0.1 3 84.9%
0.1 6 77.1%
0.3 3 65.7%
0.3 6 54.2%
(b) Average percentage of violating
strings detected across settings of ρ
and η.
Fig. 8: Summarized results. A complete version of (a) showing all 26 properties
is available in the appendix.
losses. The main goal of the study is to see if the optimal monitor is effective in
detecting violations over lossy event streams. While the primary contribution of
this work is theoretical – the optimality of our construction has been proven – it
is still informative to assess the potential for practical impact. As with similarly
oriented work, e.g., [13], we use a simulation study for this purpose and leave
the engineering of efficient tooling to future work.
We address different aspects of effectiveness by exploring the following research
questions.
RQ1: How many violations did the optimal alternate monitor miss?
A trivial monitor can miss all violations and still be “complete”, since it produces
no false positives. A lossless monitor misses no violations. Our optimal alternate
monitor lies somewhere between the two, and we wish to measure where.
RQ2: How many events did the optimal alternate monitor have to process?
The main motivation behind induced event loss is overhead control. We explore
the relation between the events missed and impact on alternate monitor’s ability
to report an error.
6.1 Methodology
We selected a number of properties from [14]. We mined 157 property specifica-
tion files from runtimeverification.com, and collected a subset of 26 proper-
ties after de-duplication for which the specification contains a regular expression
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describing the property. We also filtered out properties which are trivial for
dropped count loss model (e.g. properties that require an event occurs at most
once).
Many of these properties specify one or more creation events that are used to
instantiate new monitors according to the event’s context [15]. Skipping these
events makes monitoring impossible for subsequent events related to these mon-
itors.
We took special care to ensure that such creation events were injected into the
event stream appropriately in our study.
Our implementation reads in the property specification files and extracts 1) all
events, 2) creation events, 3) the regular expression describing the property, and
4) @match or @fail keywords which specify if a violation occurs when regex is
matched or when it fails to match, respectively. It then creates minimized DFAs
with an error state from these regexes with the help of brics.automaton library
[14].
After this pre-processing, our implementation reads in the description of prop-
erty DFA φ and computes a bounded drop loss model (using n = 5 as the bound)
on its alphabet Σ. This loss model and the property DFA are then used to cre-
ate an optimal monitor NFA, which is determinized and minimized to give an
optimal alternate monitor ψ.
To explore variation in monitor performance with trace length, we generated
traces of length n as follows:
1. If the property had a non-empty set C of creation events, the first event
was chosen randomly from C, and rest n− 1 events were chosen from Σ \C
uniformly at random;
2. Otherwise, all n events were chosen from Σ uniformly at random.
The generated traces were defined for each property using its alphabet, Σ; we
did not reuse traces across properties even if they share the same alphabet.
Each trace was then subjected to the following procedure to inject artificial loss
where count symbols are restricted to the range 1, . . . , 5. The procedure takes
two parameters ρ (probability of disabling monitoring) and η (mean length of
number of events to miss):
1. Start at the first element of the trace, if there is a creation event, replicate
it in the alternate stream and consider the next event. The following steps
are repeated until there are no more events to be processed.
2. Draw a random number disable ∼ bernoulli(ρ) which has probability ρ of
being 1 and 1− ρ of being 0.
3. If disable = 1, draw a random number l ∼ exponential(η), which is a real
number with expected value η. Ignore the next m = dle symbols in the input
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stream. If m is not divisible by 5, add a symbol for m modulo 5 and then⌊
(m/5)
⌋
“5” symbols to the alternate stream.
4. If disable = 0, add the current symbol in the original stream to the alternate
stream.
We then simulated the original property monitor φ and alternate monitor ψ on
the original and alternate event streams, respectively. Simulations ran over M =
1000 random traces each for lengths between n = 3 to n = 25, for 4 combinations
of ρ ∈ { 0.1, 0.3 } (low and high probability of disabling monitoring) and η ∈
{ 3, 6 } (low and high disable lengths). Our simulation recorded whether the
monitor exclusively reached the error state in which case it reported a violation.
6.2 Results
We summarized the results in Table 1 and Fig. 8. Here we address our RQs.
RQ1: We see that the optimal monitor reports anywhere from 60% to 94% vi-
olations for low number of losses (ρ, η = 0.1, 0.3) to 15-69% for higher number
of losses (ρ, η = 0.3, 6). There is large variation among the properties, and some
are more amenable for reporting losses than others. However, these results indi-
cate that the optimal alternate monitors are capable of detecting errors in lossy
event streams. As expected and proved earlier, these monitors did not report a
single false positive preserving the completeness of the analysis. An interesting
unanswered question left to the future work is to see what structural character-
istics of these properties cause the variation in monitorability under losses with
respect to different loss types.
RQ2: As we see in Fig. 8b, average number of events processed are 84.9% for the
low-loss case and 54.2% for the high-loss case. There is a clear trend in Table 1
of the violation percentage decreasing with an increase in incurred losses. Still,
it is promising to see that despite so many losses, 17 out of 26 properties are
able to report 40% violations or more.
6.3 Limitations and Threats to Validity
An inherent limitation of this study is that it is based on simulation and not on
real program traces. All symbols are generated with equal probability for our
artificial traces. The traces generated by real programs are likely to be biased
towards non-violating behavior for most objects. However, the primary goal of
our study is to understand the error detection capability of an alternate monitor.
We believe that our randomly generated traces exclusively model the erroneous
behavior of the violating parts of the program. Therefore, the results indicating
the error detection ability of an alternate monitor on such traces reflect its ability
to report errors in real violating behaviors.
Optimal RV over Lossy Event Streams 19
Another limitation is the number of events considered in a trace. Even though
real programs generate long traces, they often consist of a large number of short
sub-traces where each one of which belongs to a different monitor. A sub-trace
that belongs to one monitor does not interfere with the analysis of another sub-
trace. Therefore, we believe that our choice of generating short but monitor-
specific traces is justified. Moreover, as the number of events increases (refer to
Figure Fig. 8a), the ability of optimal alternate monitor to report a violation
tends to be higher. This indicates that shorter traces are more challenging for
alternate monitors than longer ones.
7 Approximate Alternate Monitors
We’ve already discussed the structure of an optimal alternate monitor. We now
move the discussion to non-optimal alternate monitors. These may be desirable
due to variety of reasons – smaller number of states, or a better tradeoff between
violations reported and overhead incurred.
For a primary-alternate optimal pair (φ, ψ∗)R, the number of states in ψ∗ may
be exponential in |Q| after determinization (up to 2|Qψ|−1, see Remark 9 below).
In our own empirical evaluation in the previous section, all properties had 5 or
fewer states in their minimized DFA form. While we observed the size of most
properties being considered in recent literature to be small (8 states or less [16]),
the properties for monitoring are allowed to be specified by the user and hence,
can have arbitrary size. Moreover, several properties specified by the user may
be combined into a single property to be monitored [12] which can have a large
size.
For properties with a large number of states, it is desirable to have alternate
monitors of size polynomial in |Q|. The problem is related to finding closest
over-approximation of a regular language within n states, which is conjectured
to be hard [13]. There is already a line of work [13,17] on over-approximation of
DFAs and NFAs which we’ve detailed in our related work section. While we do
not present or evaluate any algorithms, in this section we consider an important
property of alternate monitors that can aid development of heuristics for the
construction of such approximate monitors.
Remark 9 (Number of states in optimal determinized alternate monitor). Con-
sider a primary-alternate optimal pair (φ, ψ∗)R. ψ∗ is a NFA with |Q| states.
A NFA with n states may have upto 2n states after determinization. But as
Lemma 2 below states, S ⊆ Qψ \ qerr and S are mergable, so determinization of
ψ∗ may have only upto 2n−1, i.e. 2|Qψ|−1 states.
Definition 14 (Partition refinements). If P and Q are partitions of a set
S, Q is called a coarsening of P and P is called a refinement of Q iff ∀P ∈ P
∃Q ∈ Q such that P ⊆ Q.
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(a) Artifical NFA property
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(b) Approximate DFA property
Fig. 9: Approximate alternate monitors (For brevity, qi . . . qj is written as i . . . sj)
Lemma 2. Perr(ψ) is defined as a partition on 2Qψ such that its classes contain
exactly two elements – S ⊆ Q \ qerr and S ∪ {qerr}, i.e. Perr(ψ) = {{S, S ∪
{qerr}} | S ⊆ Qψ \ qerr}. Perr(ψ) is a refinement of the partitioning in DFA
minimization of a determinized NFA, i.e. S and S ∪{ qerr } are merged together
into a single state in the minimum-state determinization of a NFA. 
Our strategy for constructing these approximate monitors is to omit some states
in the determinized output. In order to eliminate these states, we need to answer
the question of what to do with the incoming transitions to these states. It turns
out that we can redirect the transitions to certain other states without losing
completeness. We prove this in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For a primary-alternate pair (φ, ψ)R where ψ is a superposed moni-
tor’s property, if we update δψ(S, γ)← S′ where S′ ⊇ δψ(S, γ) to obtain ψ′, then
(φ, ψ′)R is a superposed primary-alternate pair.
Proof. First, Qψ′ = Qψ and thus the states of ψ
′ can be labelled by subsets
of Qφ. We have to only show that the superposed monitor condition holds. We
induct on length of f(x).
Base Case:
∣∣f(x)∣∣ = 0. Mψ′ is in q0 and Mφ is in q0.
Induction Hypothesis: For
∣∣f(x)∣∣ = n, δφ(q0, x) ∈ δψ′({ q0 } , f(x)).
Induction Step: Consider a observed lossy stream of length n + 1: f(x · a) =
y · γ, γ ∈ R(a), |y| = n. Let q = δφ(q0, x), and q′ = δφ(q0, x · a). We have to show
that q′ ∈ δψ′(q0, y · γ).
q′ ∈ δψ(q, γ) (∵Mψ is superposed)
δψ(q, γ) ⊆ δψ′(q, γ) (by construction)
=⇒ q′ ∈ δψ′(q, γ) (1)
q ∈ δψ′(q0, y) (2: from IH)
=⇒ q′ ∈ δψ′(δψ′(q0, y), γ) (from 1 and 2)
=⇒ q′ ∈ δψ′(q0, y · γ) uunionsq
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Using the Lemma 3, we can discard a state S and redirect all its incoming
transitions to another state S′ ∈ 2Q, S′ ⊇ S, while still retaining completeness.
We can now choose n states to keep in 2Q and discard others to construct an
alternate monitor with a DFA property that has n states.
We show an example in Fig. 9 of a NFA’s approximate determinization. This
approximate monitor is on 6 states, whereas the complete minimum-state deter-
minization of Fig. 9 has 8 states and is able to report violations on more strings
(e.g. “bcb”). Still, the approximate monitor does not lose the error reporting
ability and neither does it lose completeness.
8 Related Work
Runtime monitoring has been an active research area over the past few decades.
A significant part of the research in this area has focused on optimizing monitors
and controlling the runtime overhead to make monitoring employable in practice.
Here, we discuss work which is closely related to our approach.
A line of research [18,4,6,19] focuses on lossless partial evaluation of the finite
state property to build residual monitors which process fewer events during
runtime. [6] and [19] can be modelled in our framework using loss models where
R−1(y) is a singleton set.
Another line of research [12,20] does not focus directly on reducing the number
of events to be processed but proposes purely dynamic optimizations where re-
sources at run-time are constrained. Allabadi et al. [20] constrain the number
of monitors in a way which retains completeness but loses soundness, and Pu-
randare et al. [12] combine multiple monitor which share events into a single
monitor to reduce the number of monitors updated.
Kauffman et al. [21] and Joshi et al. [22] consider monitorability of LTL formulas
under losses. [21] considers natural losses such as loss, corruption, repetition, or
out-of-order arrival of an event and gives an algorithm to find monitorability of a
LTL formula. They do not construct a monitor, which monitors lossy traces. [22]
considers monitorability of LTL formulas in the presence of one loss type which
is equivalent to our dropped-count filter in Fig. 3a with n = 1. They only handle
the formulas whose synthesized monitor has transitions, which always lead to
just one state, and their construction is only able to recover from losses when it
observes such a transition. In general, recurrence temporal properties [23] that
can be modeled by Bu¨chi automata are naturally immune to event losses due to
loops in their structures. Our work primarily focuses on safety properties.
Falzon et al. [8] consider the construction of an alternate sound monitor when
for some parts of the traces only aggregate information, such as the frequency
of events but not their order, is available. We formalize this loss type in our
framework in §5.
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Dwyer et al. [9] consider sub-properties formed when the alphabet is restricted
to its subset to sample sub-properties from a given property. Their construction
ensures completeness and is equivalent to our construction with R = {(x, y) |
x ∈ ∆∗y ∀y ∈ Σ \ ∆}, where ∆ is the set of symbols not observed as events.
Fig. 4b generalizes it with R = { (x, y) | x ∈ ∆∗y ∀y ∈ Σ }
Basin et al. [24] introduce a 3-valued timed logic to account for missing informa-
tion in recorded traces for offline analysis. This allows them to report 3 results:
if a violation occurred, if it did not occur, or if the knowledge is insufficient to
report either. In the problem we consider, instead of having a single representa-
tion for missing information we can have multiple representations for different
losses which can differ in their power to report an error.
Bartocci et al. [25] introduce statistical methods to inform overhead control
and minimize the probability of missing a violation. For the monitors which are
disabled, [26] introduces statistical methods to predict the missing information
due to sampling, which is then used in [25] to get a probability that the violation
occurred in an incomplete run. Instead of disabling monitoring altogether and
predicting missing information, our approach records lossy information about
the events to report violations while maintaining completeness.
Recent work considers over-approximation of DFAs and NFAs in the context of
network packet inspection [27,17,28] and in the general setting [13]. [17] considers
keeping only a subset of frequently-visited states and merging the other states
into the final state. [13] formulates the problem of finding an over-approximating
DFA as a search problem and provide heuristics to solve it. A part of their
algorithm involves a NFA to DFA conversion mechanism which merges state q1
into q2 if Lq1 ⊆ Lq2 , which is similar to the operation we perform in Lemma 3.
[27] consider over-approximating NFAs by adding self-loops to selected states,
which is equivalent to merging them into qacc in the expanded DFA. This leads
to any transition going through those paths to be unmonitorable, whereas we
merge the states with one of the selected (possibly monitorable) superstates.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we presented an efficient approach to support finite state monitoring
of lossy event streams, where the losses could be natural or artificially induced.
Our approach maintains completeness and is optimally sound. In addition to
making monitoring feasible under these conditions, the approach should help
improve the performance of monitoring enabling its deployment in production
environments. We provide efficient methods to construct optimal monitors auto-
matically from property specifications. We provide an example of how this can
be extended in the future to construct approximate alternate monitors for larger
properties. We hope that this novel approach will make monitoring particularly
attractive under in the presence of high-frequency events and lossy channels.
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In the future, we would like to extend our framework to address infinite state
monitors and empirically compare various loss types.
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10 Appendix
10.1 §3
Proof (Lemma 1). We refer to the DFA minimization algorithm in [10] which
works by 1) constructing an undirected graphG of states which cannot be merged
together and 2) constructing classes of states which will be merged together.
Suppose S1 ∈ [S2]. To prove: S1 ∪ S2 ∈ [S2].
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose S1 ∪ S2 6∈ [S2]. Then (S1 ∪ S2, S2) 6∈ G.
This implies ∃x ∈ Σ∗ such that one of δ(S1, x) and δ(S1 ∪S2, x) is a final state
in the DFA and the other isn’t.
Case 1: δ(S1∪S2, x)∩F = φ∧δ(S2, x)∩F 6= φ. δ(S1∪S2, x) = δ(S1, x)∪δ(S2,
x) ∩ F =⇒ F ∩ δ(S1, x) 6= φ ∧ F ∩ δ(S2, x) 6= φ, a contradiction.
Case 2: δ(S1∪S2, x)∩F 6= φ∧δ(S2, x)∩F = φ. ∃q ∈ F s.t. q ∈ δ(S1∪S2, x) =⇒
q ∈ δ(S1, x) ∪ δ(S2, x) =⇒ q ∈ δ(S1, x).
This implies δ(S1, x) ∩ F 6= φ =⇒ (S1, S2) ∈ G, which is a contradiction.
10.2 §4
Proof (Remark 5). δ(q,R−1(y)) is polynomial time computable for R repre-
sented as a NFT] If R is represented by a NFT, then R−1(y) is a regex and
δ(q1, R
−1(y)) = S can be computed in polynomial time: ∀ q2 ∈ Q the intersec-
tion of R−1(y) and the regex formed by the set of strings which go from q1 to
q2 is nonempty then q2 ∈ S. We loop over O(n) states and check if each is in S,
and in each iteration the intersection and checking non-emptiness is polynomial
time.
Definition 15 (Lsopt(φ,R)). For a property φ and loss model R, Lsopt(φ,R) =def
FR(L(φ)C), i.e. Lsopt is the set of lossy strings in Γ ∗ produced by a error ex-
ecution in Σ∗. Lsopt is the smallest set of strings on which a sound alternate
monitor cannot reach a true verdict.
Proof. (Remark 8) We argue that the construction in Remark 8 recognizes Lsopt.
It is based on the superposed monitor construction in Theorem 3. Since su-
perposed monitor guarantees that if original monitor is in state qerr, alternate
monitor current state S contains qerr and hence we will report the string as a
violation. Therefore the construction is sound.
Since the construction in Theorem 3 is the minimum set of states we must be in
to monitor while maintaining completeness, it is guaranteed that ∀ q ∈ S for the
current alternate monitor state S, ∃x ∈ Σ∗ and f ∈ FR such that δφ(q0, x) = q
and q ∈ δψ(q0, f(x)). Therefore we only error on strings present in Lsopt.
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10.3 §7
Proof. Lemma 2 The only nonaccept state in the determinization of an alternate
NFA is { qerr } .
Now for any string x ∈ Σ∗, either δ(S, x) = { qerr } = δ(S ∪ { qerr } , x) or
δ(q, x) 6= { qerr } 6= δ(S ∪ { qerr } , x), i.e. either both end up in an accept state,
or both in a nonaccept state.
Fig. 10: String length vs percentage of reported violations, for all properties
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Table 2: Error detection for medium strings (Length 10 to 15).
Property ρ : 0.1, η : 3 ρ : 0.1, η : 6 ρ : 0.3, η : 3 ρ : 0.3, η : 6
ArrayDeque UnsafeIterator 84% (4986) 78% (4971) 51% (4978) 39% (4981)
Collections SynchronizedCollection 82% (4910) 75% (4915) 48% (4924) 39% (4918)
Collections SynchronizedMap 66% (3702) 55% (3717) 23% (3728) 17% (3660)
Collection UnsynchronizedAddAll 96% (4998) 90% (5000) 76% (4999) 65% (4999)
Console CloseReader 94% (4991) 88% (4989) 73% (4989) 58% (4985)
HttpURLConnection SetBeforeConnect 94% (4996) 87% (4993) 74% (4988) 58% (4988)
InputStream MarkAfterClose 94% (4989) 87% (4985) 74% (4990) 60% (4987)
Iterator RemoveOnce 91% (4757) 86% (4757) 67% (4744) 60% (4774)
ListIterator RemoveOnce 84% (3853) 79% (3813) 55% (3812) 50% (3855)
ListIterator Set 87% (4622) 80% (4602) 57% (4586) 46% (4588)
List UnsynchronizedSubList 83% (4986) 77% (4978) 51% (4975) 40% (4979)
Map UnsafeIterator 65% (3673) 56% (3717) 23% (3635) 16% (3683)
Math ContendedRandom 98% (5000) 95% (4998) 91% (4998) 81% (5000)
NavigableSet Modification 66% (3687) 59% (3687) 23% (3697) 16% (3691)
PushbackInputStream UnreadAheadLimit 91% (4852) 84% (4842) 70% (4819) 56% (4832)
Reader ReadAheadLimit 91% (4709) 85% (4698) 70% (4713) 58% (4699)
Reader UnmarkedReset 90% (2583) 89% (2519) 70% (2547) 70% (2510)
Scanner ManipulateAfterClose 84% (4985) 77% (4979) 50% (4980) 39% (4979)
ServerSocket SetTimeoutBeforeBlocking 97% (5000) 91% (4999) 81% (4999) 67% (4997)
ServiceLoader MultipleConcurrentThreads 88% (5000) 85% (4996) 63% (4996) 56% (5000)
Socket CloseInput 83% (4978) 77% (4984) 50% (4974) 40% (4974)
Socket InputStreamUnavailable 97% (5000) 91% (4998) 82% (4996) 69% (5000)
Socket LargeReceiveBuffer 85% (4994) 82% (4982) 55% (4988) 47% (4992)
Socket ReuseAddress 86% (4986) 80% (4990) 57% (4984) 48% (4988)
Thread SetDaemonBeforeStart 98% (4999) 94% (4999) 89% (4998) 79% (4998)
Throwable InitCauseOnce 85% (4811) 77% (4778) 53% (4781) 39% (4785)
Table 3: Error detection for large strings (Length 15 to 20). Only the
properties which still have at least one non-violating string shown.
Property ρ : 0.1, η : 3 ρ : 0.1, η : 6 ρ : 0.3, η : 3 ρ : 0.3, η : 6
ArrayDeque UnsafeIterator 87% (4999) 83% (5000) 58% (4999) 48% (5000)
Collections SynchronizedCollection 86% (4987) 81% (4987) 55% (4992) 45% (4989)
Collections SynchronizedMap 73% (4572) 61% (4547) 29% (4566) 21% (4575)
Console CloseReader 98% (5000) 92% (4999) 86% (5000) 70% (5000)
HttpURLConnection SetBeforeConnect 98% (4998) 92% (4999) 86% (4998) 71% (5000)
InputStream MarkAfterClose 98% (4999) 93% (5000) 85% (5000) 70% (5000)
Iterator RemoveOnce 93% (4915) 89% (4915) 73% (4905) 65% (4913)
ListIterator RemoveOnce 85% (4263) 80% (4252) 59% (4267) 50% (4261)
ListIterator Set 90% (4851) 84% (4854) 64% (4840) 53% (4851)
List UnsynchronizedSubList 88% (4998) 83% (4998) 59% (4999) 48% (4998)
Map UnsafeIterator 72% (4542) 63% (4531) 30% (4519) 21% (4574)
NavigableSet Modification 73% (4552) 62% (4560) 32% (4569) 21% (4553)
PushbackInputStream UnreadAheadLimit 95% (4966) 88% (4949) 80% (4953) 66% (4965)
Reader ReadAheadLimit 95% (4903) 88% (4910) 79% (4914) 66% (4902)
Reader UnmarkedReset 90% (2458) 90% (2549) 69% (2483) 71% (2497)
Scanner ManipulateAfterClose 88% (5000) 83% (4999) 58% (4999) 48% (4999)
Socket CloseInput 88% (5000) 82% (4999) 59% (5000) 48% (4999)
Socket LargeReceiveBuffer 89% (4999) 85% (4999) 61% (5000) 55% (5000)
Socket ReuseAddress 89% (5000) 84% (4999) 63% (4999) 54% (4999)
Throwable InitCauseOnce 93% (4953) 84% (4966) 66% (4959) 50% (4955)
